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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Review of the Relevance of the Suicide Evidence
The State indicates that the question of the relevance of the suicide evidence should be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State's brief at 1, citing Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining, 944
P.2d 357 (Utah 1997). Jones cites the standard of review under Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and is
not directly applicable to the question of relevance under Rule 401.

While there are older Utah

cases indicating that questions of relevance are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, e ^ Bambrough
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286,1290 (Utah 1976), more recent cases demonstrate that the Court may
consider the actual function performed by the trial court in determining the level of deference to be
granted to a particular ruling of the trial court. See e,g. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938-39 (Utah
1994). See also State v. Doporto. 935 P.2d 484,490 (Utah 1998)(implying that abuse of discretion
standard of review does not necessarily apply to questions of general relevance).
Given the simplicity of determining the relevance of the suicide evidence, this Court should
review the trial court's ruling on this issue with very little deference. .See Pena.
2. Review of the Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction
The State indicates that "Whether an instruction properly states the standard of proof is a
question of law, State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,1231 (Utah 1997), with the specific wording left
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,1146 (Utah 1989)." State's brief at
2. The portion of the Johnson opinion referred to is a plurality opinion which does not indicate that
a trial judge has discretion to choose the wording of an instruction. A standard granting trial courts
much discretion in stating the law injury instructions would be incompatible with several Utah cases

1

reviewing given jury instructions for correctness. See e.g. Ong International v. 11th Avenue Corp.,
850 P.2d 447,452 (Utah 1993).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State begins its statement of facts with footnote 4, which states,
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict but, nevertheless, argues the relevancy and prejudice of excluded evidence.
Defendant disclaims his responsibility to marshal the facts {Brief of Appellant
[Br.App.J at 25), and impermissibly states facts supporting his theory while ignoring
adverse evidence. See State v. ScheeL 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1991). The
State recites the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993).
State's brief at 4 n.4.
In his statement of facts, Mr. Jaeger has not ignored adverse evidence, but has attempted to
summarize the evidence in a thorough and accurate manner, in order to facilitate the Court's review
of the issues presented.1 Jaeger's approach is consistent with U*ah law; even when appellate Courts
recite the facts in the manner most favorable to the jury's verdict, the Courts also acknowledge
evidence conflicting with the verdict when doing so is necessary to understanding the issues
presented. See e.g. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993).

Mr. Jaeger did not disclaim a responsibility to marshal the evidence, but attempted to marshal
the evidence when he challenged Judge Wilkinson's reasoning that the suicide evidence was
irrelevant because it was too speculative and because Ms. Bamdt was appreciably more mature at
the time of her death than at the time she reported having attempted suicide. See Jaeger's opening
brief at 24-25.
Because Jaeger has not raised insufficiency of the evidence, he has no obligation to marshal
the evidence in stating the facts. Cf. State v. ScheeL 823 P.2d 470,473 (Utah App. 1991 )(discussing
marshaling requirement in the context of a claim of insufficient evidence).
2

Aside from the State's choice to state the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, review of the record demonstrates that the State is in error in several instances in its
statement of the facts.2

2

The State disputes that the officers were vague in establishing the location of the gun when
the officers arrived, and claims that the gun was "but one or two feet" from Barndt's right foot.
State's brief at 5 and n.6, citing R. 824, 834-35. Pages 824, 834 and 835 of the record do not
indicate the distance that the gun was lying from Barndt's foot or feet.
The State indicates, "The police officers taped 'brand new' brown lunch bags taken from a
kitchen drawer over Mary's hands to preserve evidence. (R. 836-37, 845, 856)." State's brief at 5.
The cited pages of the record do not establish that the bags were actually brand new, but indicate that
the officer who grabbed them out of the kitchen drawer thought they looked brand new, but did not
know if they had been used before.
The State indicates, "Defendant was escorted to his living room where he calmed down (R.
864,870,872-73,875). The police officer who interviewed him felt that 'pretty much' they carried
on a 'normal conversation' (id.)." State's brief at 5. The record pages cited by the State nowhere
indicate that the officer said that they "pretty much" carried on a "normal conversation." While the
officer characterized his and Jaeger's conversation as calm, and said that Jaeger eventually settled
down (R. 875), he also said that Jaeger was excited to say the least (R. 872), upset and emotional (R.
873).
The State indicates, "Despite his alleged fear, defendant admitted that he tried to call Begay
that night to tell him to come over because Begay owed him money (R. 584)." State's brief at 6 n.5.
Pages 584 and 585 of the record demonstrate that Jaeger was calling around to find Begay, who
owed him money, but make no mention of Jaeger intending to tell Begay to come over.
The State indicates that James Gaskill "explained that batteries or other automotive sources
could not account for the presence of all three elements: 'I can't think of any source of all three of
those coming together in the form of a spherical particle [except for gunshot]. I've never
encountered it' (R. 283, 284-86; see also R. 481)." State's brief at 8. Gaskill testified that had not
tested the environment where Jaeger worked and did not know if spherical particles described as
unique to GSR would be found in Jaeger's workplace (R. 286).
The State indicates, "The rest of the workplace particles were inconsistent with the GSR
particles found on defendant's hands in that the workplace particles contained lead, a substance not
found in gunshot residue (R. 468-470)." State's brief at 9. Lead is actually one of the three elements
normally found in GSR (R. 985-986).
The State indicates, "Nor did the bags removed from Mary's hands have 'great[] forensic
significance' in this case {Br. App. at 17). Gaskill explained that it was 'not very important' to test
the bags (R. 302)." State's brief at 10 n.7. Page 302 of the record contains no testimony by Gaskill
that testing the bags was "not very important," but includes his opinion that the forensic value of the
bags would have been minimal because it would have taken a long time to test the large, fibrous
bags.
3

The State indicates, "Defendant's claim that the use of bags has 'questionable scientific
validity' (Br. App. at 17), ignores the expert's complete testimony. Gaskill was asked about one
scientific journal article which expressed some 'reservations' ^bout the use of bagging as a means
of preserving evidence. Gaskill testified that while the article noted a possible weakness in the
process (R. 300), bagging was still the best way of preserving evidence (R. 295)." State's brief at
10 n.7. Gaskill acknowledged that the article in question was published in a learned treatise he
sometimes relied on, and testified that he did not disagree with the article's conclusion that the
practice of bagging the hands of GSR test subjects may result in the destruction of evidence (R. 300).
The State claims, "In Mr. Gaskill's opinion, it would be impossible tofirethis particular gun
without getting residue on the hands of the shooter. (R. 994-95)" State's brief at 11. Gaskill's
testimony was that he would expect to find GSR on the hands of the person who hadfiredthe gun
"except that it's of course possible to wipe it off or wash your hands." (R. 995).
The State indicates, "And even though a lack of GSR is not conclusive proof that the tested
person is not the shooter, Gaskill explained that this was because, theoretically, the person after
firing the gun could remove all GSR by washing their hands under running water or by some similar
act (R. 475-76, 988). Even assuming that Mary fired the gun and her hands had been rubbed as
Defendant hypothesized, Gaskill testified that he would still expect some GSR to be on her hands
(R. 320)." Gaskill actually testified that the GSR may not have deposit on a shooter's hands in the
first place, or that it could be removed entirely by rubbing off in a bag, by coming in contact with
fluids, clothing, another person's hands, or during medical treatment (R. 476-77). While page 302
indicates that Gaskill testified that he would not have expected all the GSR to have been removed
from Ms. Barndt's hands by herflailingaround with bags on her hands, he was not asked if other
factors or activities in this case might have resulted in the absence of GSR on her hands (R. 302).
The State indicates, "He admitted that he had not told the truth when he previously said he
had dry-fired the gun (R. 606-07, 617-18, 620, 626)." State's brief at 11. None of the cited pages
support this assertion; they indicate that Jaeger thought he had not dry-fired the gun that night, but
could not recall and may have done so, as he told the detective.
The State indicates, "Defendant claims on appeal that the 911 tape supports the theory that
the gun was next to Mary's hand and then moved by defendant at the direction of the operator (Br.
App. at 13). He also contends that it was only due to the passage of time that he could not remember
if he had actually moved it (Br. App. at 12). Defendant made neither of these contentions below.
He consistently denied that he touched the gun until, faced with the positive GSR results, he began
offering shifting theories of how the residue got on his hands. Defendant never stated that he
actually moved the weapon (R. 602-03,626-27,867-68,921 -22,834,955)." State's brief at 13 n. 12.
In his testimony, Jaeger was never certain about whether or not he touched the gun. Consistent with
Jaeger's testimony, his brief indicates only that Jaeger may have touched the gun, and refers to
testimony from one of the responding officers indicating that Jaeger was so upset when the police
arrived that he may have touched the gun and honestly not have recalled having done so (R. 957).
Jaeger's opening brief at 12-13. See also id- at 12 n. 13 (demonstrating that Jaeger never took the
opportunity to conform the facts to explain the GSR results, despite having been informed by the
police about possible explanations for how the GSR came to be on his hands). The State indicates,
4

ARGUMENT
THE EXCLUSION OF THE PAST SUICIDE ATTEMPT AS IRRELEVANT
VIOLATED JAEGER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE
AND REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
I. THE FACTS ESTABLISHED BY THE RECORD
The State errs in describing Judge Wilkinson's ruling excluding the ARTEC records. While
the State maintains that the fourth reason that Judge Wilkinson excluded the records was that "there
was no expert evidence to otherwise establish the relevance or probativeness of the 1986 statement

"On cross examination, the medical examiner agreed that it was theoretically possible that a person
of Mary's size could self-inflict this type of wound but only if she fully extended her right arm,
simultaneously shrugged her shoulders to raise her clavicle, and then used her thumb to pull the
trigger (R. 365-67, 373)." State's brief at 14. Pages 365, 366, and 373 of the record do not indicate
that Leis testified that Ms. Barndt would have had to fully extend her arm, but merely indicate that
she could have shot herself if she used her thumb to pull the trigger. Pages 365, 366 and 373 of the
record do not indicate that Ms. Bamdt would have had to simultaneously shrug while fully extending
her arm, but indicate that the trajectory of the bullet indicated that if Ms. Bamdt shot herself, she may
have shrugged, flinched, changed her mind, covered her face with the non-shooting hand, or done
something else.
The State indicates that Jaeger "admitted on cross-examination, that it was 'possible' that
during their argument, he had thrown [the bra] at her, telling her to put it on (R. 600-01, 643-44)."
State's brief at 17-18. Jaeger's testimony was that he did not remember anything about the bra, but
that he guessed "anything could be possible." (R. 643).
The State indicates, "[DJefense counsel attempted to characterize Mary's statement about her
child as one of outside adoption. But Judy Clark clarified that while Judy may have used the
'adoption' in speaking with the police she simply meant having the natural father take the child (R.
394, 428)." Actually, while defense counsel did note that Ms. Clark did not mention the father in
discussing Ms. Barndt's fears of giving her baby up for adoption (R. 428), defense counsel discussed
Ms. Barndt's comments about "giving the child up for adoption to a family member" in crossexamining Dr. Leis (R. 368).
The State indicates, "He was also finalizing a 'rough' divorce and was concerned about the
divorce's impact in his children (id. [apparently referring to the previous record citations to R. 633,
636, 898-99])." State's brief at 20. While one of the owners of the shop where Jaeger worked
testified that Jaeger was going through a divorce in August of 1990, and was concerned about its
impact on his children if the owner could recall correctly (R. 898-99), Jaeger actually testified that
the divorce wasfinalin August of 1990, and that he was not suffering stress as a result of the divorce
at that time, because his wife was letting him take his children (R. 633, 635-636).
5

to the events of 1990," State's brief at 24,3 Judge Wilkinson did not indicate that this was a basis for
exclusion of the evidence, when he finally ruled, stating,
The court has read exhibit No. 45, and the court would sustain the state's
objection to it, that 99 percent of it is irrelevant. The court finds it's very speculative,
both as to content and as to the time element.
(R. 657).
There are statements throughout the document pertaining to suicide, which
are contrary to what is expressed in the statement which you want admitted;
therefore, the court would feel that it's very speculative. The court would feel that
it was at a time when a person was being admitted to an institution for being
ungovernable, when she was a teenager of 15 years, and that time element would be
a factor here, and the court would deny the admissibility of the document."
(R. 668).4
Judge Wilkinson had initially indicated that the medical examiner's testimony opened the
door regarding Ms. Barndt's suicidal tendencies (R. 416). He indicated his doubts about whether
the alleged prior suicide in the ARTEC records would be admissible on the other defense theory to counter the State's evidence that Ms. Barndt was not in a suicidal state of mind at the time of her
death, and queried whether there would be expert testimony to demonstrate that a suicide attempt
in Ms. Barndt's past would be probative of the likelihood that she were capable of suicide in 1990.
But he did not indicate that such expert testimony was a prerequisite to the admission of the evidence

3

The State repeats this assertion on pages 29, 33 and 41 of its brief.
4

The actual language of Judge Wilkinson's ruling also calls into question the State's argument
that the judge's ruling implicitly reflected the court's "concern that a battle over Mary's state of mind
in 1986 would be time consuming and misdirect the jury from the relevant issue which was her state
of mind in 1990 (R. 416, 553, 657, 668)." State's brief at 34, continued n.26.
6

(R. 416-417).5 While Judge Wilkinson did at one point indicate that the defense "would need to
have the person come and testify," (R. 555), it appears that this was a reference to his earlier
suggestion that defense counsel bring the records custodian to an in camera hearing (R. 416), and
was not a ruling that expert testimony was needed to establish the relevance of the testimony for
impeaching Dr. Leis's conclusion that Barndt was a homicide victim.
The State claims that the medical examiner was the only witness who opined on the
likelihood that Barndt had committed suicide, and that other witnesses were only asked about Ms.

Immediately after defense counsel argued that the records were admissible to challenge the
medical examiner's opinion that Ms. Barndt did not commit suicide, which was based in part on a
lack of suicidal history, and to challenge the testimony of other of the State's witnesses who
indicated that Ms. Barndt was planning for her future and did not seem suicidal at the time of her
death (R. 415), Judge Wilkinson stated,
The court would allow the defense to bring in a records keeper form R-tech,
and that I would want an in camera hearing at that point to see just exactly what this
is and where it's going.
I'm of this opinion, that I think that the statement made by the medical
examiner this morning does open the door as far as the tendencies to commit suicide,
because one of the elements which he said was that she didn't have that tendency, or
it was not apparent.
So I understand what you're saying on the other, too; I'm not persuaded by
those. It does raise an issue in the court's mind as to when the person had been in
1986, when she would have been what, 15?
MR. BRASS: Sixteen, to age 16.
THE COURT: That there is quite a bit of difference there as far as a young,
ungovernable teenager, and a 19-year-old. There's quite a bit of difference.
And I don't know that either of you have testimony, or if you're going to have
testimony from anybody, as an expert, as to what that would mean.
Of course, I'm thinking of the medical examiner. But at this point, I would
not let it in without an in camera hearing. Then I would make that determination.
(R. 416-17).
7

Barndt's mood and demeanor in the summer of 1990, and about her conversations with them on the
day she died. State's brief at 29 n. 24, citing R. 456-57,484-85, 897, 903-04.6
Actually, numerous witnesses testified either directly or to the effect that Mary Barndt was
planning for her future and was unlikely to commit suicide.7
The State claims that "it was undisputed that Mary was not despondent and had not made
suicidal threats in 1990 (R. 610), and had no suicidal thoughts while ARTEC in 1986-87 (R. 414),
the caseworker's note was the only evidence that Mary had any 'history of suicide.'" State's brief
at 31.
Page 610 of the record is Mr. Jaeger's testimony that Ms. Barndt was not upset or angry and
did not appear to be despondent when she came to see him at work on the day she died, and does not
address whether she was depressed or threatened suicide in 1990.

6

This argument is repeated on page 36 of the State's brief.
7

Ms. Barndt's mother testified that she did not think that Mary committed suicide when the
police called to report Mary's death, and that she was never in a group therapy session wherein Mary
discussed having attempted suicide(R. 440, 443). She testified that in her last conversation with
Mary, Mary told her she would call her tomorrow and said other things indicating her plans for the
future (R. 431). Ms. Barndt's mother also volunteered, "[S]he never told me that she wanted to kill
herself, ever." (R. 442).
When the prosecutor asked Paul Miller if there was "anything that would indicate to [him]
in [his] contact with Mary Barndt that would suggest she would try to commit suicide," Mr. Miller
said there was not, and found her to be a nice girl with a bubbly personality, although he did not
know her well (R. 903-04).
Ms. Barndt's father testified that by nature, Mary was irrepressible and "couldn't be put
down," and had plans for her future(R. 484,488).
Ms. Barndt's brother testified that she was not despondent or depressed, but was bubbly and
enjoyed life and doing things and was excited about her future plans (R. 456-58).
8

The State repeatedly seeks to undermine the reliability of the ARTEC records by noting that
the records contained only the uncorroborated claim of an "ungovernable fifteen year old" that she
had attempted suicide. State's brief at 32-33, 39.
The ARTEC records include not only the statement of Ms. Barndt, but also other references
to a suicide attempt which are not attributed specifically to Ms. Barndt, and an indication that Ms.
Barndt was referred to the residential program for a suicide attempt. See Defense Exhibits 45 and
45A.
The State claims that the absence of any known history of suicide was not a major factor in
the medical examiner's opinion that Barndt did not commit suicide, and argues that the lack of
suicide history was only discussed "in connection with his conclusion that the range of firing was
atypical of suicide." State's brief at 42 n.32.
The lack of a suicide history and range of firing were separate, unrelated, major factors
underlying the medical examiner's opinion that Bamdt did not commit suicide (R. 355, 368).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. THE ARTEC RECORDS WERE ADMISSIBLE AS NON-HEARSAY FOR THE
PURPOSE OF IMPEACHMENT,
The State argues that the ARTEC records were hearsay because they were only valuable if
true in alleging a prior suicide attempt by Ms. Barndt. State's brief at 30-31. While the truth of the
suicide records would certainly have been helpful to Mr. Jaeger's case, the records were not
admissible solely to prove their truth, but were admissible for impeachment of Dr. Leis, who based
his conclusion that Ms. Bamdt was murdered in part on her purported lack of a history of suicide.
The records were admissible for impeachment of the other witnesses who testified concerning Ms.
9

Bamdt's history and character as a non-suicidal person. Cf. e ^ Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533,
539 (Utah 1981)(in ruling that medical texts were admissible to cross-examine the opponent's
expert's opinion, the Court stated, "Since the texts in this case were not offered as substantive
evidence, but rather to discredit the witness's testimony, there was no hearsay problem."), overruled
on other grounds. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995).
B. THE RECORDS WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE MEDICAL RECORDS
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE,
The State contends that the ARTEC records were properly excluded despite their status as
medical records, because the records were contradictory regarding whether Ms. Barndt was ever
suicidal, and unclear about the details of any alleged attempted suicide. State's brief at 31-33.
While the records demonstrate that Ms. Barndt was unwilling to disclose details of her
suicide attempt, the records are not confusing in documenting her report of a suicide attempt. This
Court's review of the records, which have been transmitted to this Court as exhibits 45 and 45 A, will
demonstrate that Ms. Barndt frequently denied present suicidal ideation at the time of her stay in
ARTEC, but that she revealed a suicide attempt prior to her entry into the ARTEC program. Cf.
State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136,1139 (Utah 1977)(statement was not admissible for various reasons,
including its truly confusing nature).8

8

The State's reliance on Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314,323 and
n.30 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs, 678 P,2d 298 (Utah 1984), for
the proposition that the ARTEC records were excludible because they were too remote, is misplaced.
See State's brief at 33. Terry is a civil case in which the trial court properly excluded some only
details concerning the plaintiffs prior actions for several reasons in addition to the remoteness of
the incident in question, including the fact that it bore on the issue of damages and may have
prejudiced the jurors' assessment of liability. Terry, 605 P.2d at 323.
10

Given that Dr. Leis's pivotal conclusion that Ms. Barndt was a homicide victim, rather than
a suicide victim, was based in part on a lack of "any background history that she was suicidal" (R.
355), the existence of this history was not too remote to be probative in this case, and would not have
been unfairly prejudicial to any other issue, and the trial court should not have completely excluded
the recordsfromevidence.
C. THE RECORDS WERE ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE
MS. BARNDT'S STATE OF MIND.
The State argues that the ARTEC records were not admissible under the state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule, because Ms. Barndt's statements in 1986 that she had attempted
suicide in the past did not bear on her state of mind at the time the statement was made or at the time
of her death in 1990. State's brief at 34 through 38.
Ms. Barndt's statement that she had attempted suicide at some point in her past bore on her
state of mind in 1986, as one capable of contemplating and attempting suicide. Through the
testimony of Dr. Leis and various other witnesses, the State repeatedly introduced the idea that Ms.
Barndt was not of a suicidal state of mind in 1990 because she was characteristically and historically
not of a mind to attempt suicide, and her statement that she did attempt suicide in the ARTEC
records thus was also relevant in 1990.9
9

See State v.Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377,1380 (Utah 1977)("Where it is claimed the deceased
committed suicide there would seem to be relevance in the hearsay statements of the decedent which
would tend to explain acts or conduct on the part of the declarant."); State v. Auble. 754 P.2d 935,
937 (Utah 1988)(allowing for the admission of out-of-court statements of alleged homicide victim
to establish victim's state of mind if defense of suicide puts victim's state of mind in issue); State
v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221,1227 (Utah 1989)(out-of-court statei lents of alleged homicide victim are
admissible by prosecution if defense of suicide puts victim's state of mind in issue); State v. Wetzel
868 P.2d 64, 68-69 (Utah 1994)(if defense of suicide puts decedent's state of mind in issue,
decedent's out-of-court statements bearing on that issue may be admissible for the prosecution).
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D. THE RECORDS WERE ADMISSIBLE TO ESTABLISH MS. BARNDT'S
CHARACTER AS ONE CAPABLE OF ATTEMPTING SUICIDE.
In response to Jaeger's argument that the ARTEC recoids were admissible to establish Ms.
Barndt's character as one capable of attempting suicide under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(a) and
405, the State relies exclusively on inapposite cases.10

The State cites numerous cases in support of its claim that the ARTEC records were
inadmissible under the state of mind exception. State's brief at 37-38. Review of the cases
demonstrates their lack of supportive authority.
In Terry, supra, a civil case, the incident in question was not completely excluded from
evidence, but details were, because the evidence was admitted on the issue of damages, and might
have unfairly prejudiced the case on liability. 605 P.2d at 322-323. Here, the attempted suicide was
completely excluded from evidence, and its admission went to the heart of the most contested point
in this criminal case — whether Ms. Barndt committed suicide, or whether the State had proved she
was a homicide victim.
The State cites State v. Kelly, 953 S.W.2d 73, 83 (Mo.Ct.App. 1997), for this proposition:
"statements of deceased victim not admissible under state of mind exception to show victim
committed suicide where defendant did not claim that he was involved in her death". State's brief
at 37. The Kelly case is aper curiam opinion which does not appear to discuss anything mentioned
by the State in its parenthetical, but discusses the use of hearsay testimony under the state of mind
exception to establish a defendant's motive.
The State cites United States v. Veltmann. 6 F.3d 1483, 1493-95 (11th Cir. 1993), for this
proposition: "in arson and fraud case, error to exclude, under state of mind exception, deceased's
videotaped deposition testimony and handwritten letters containing statements that deceased
intended to commit suicide". State's brief at 37. Veltmann was a homicide and fraud case, which
involved the improper exclusion of a videotaped deposition of a non-victim, detailing the victim's
past suicidal history.
The State cites State v. Walker. 422 S.E.2d 716, 722 (N.C.), cert denied. 508 U.S. 919
(1993), for this proposition: "homicide victim's 'documented' history of using the same gun to
threatened suicide and her statement, one week, before her death, that she would 'kill herself before
she would live without defendant' admissible under state of mind exception; nevertheless, evidence
was sufficient to convict of murder." State's brief at 37-38. The propriety of admission of evidence
of the victim's suicidal history under the state of mind exception was not addressed on appeal in
Walker; the evidence was only summarized in the court's rejection of a claim of insufficient
evidence.
10

State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), was recently limited by the amendment of Utah
Rule of Evidence 404(b), and in any event has no application to the issue before the Court in this
case. Doporto deals with prior bad acts evidence admitted against a criminal defendant under
12

The State argues that the ARTEC records were lacking in probative value, because Ms.
Bamdt's statements were the only evidence of her attempted suicide. The ARTEC records include
mention of an attempted suicide without attributing the allegation to Ms. Bamdt, and also reflect that
a suicide attempt was a basis for Ms. Barndt's initial referral to the ARTEC program. See defense
exhibits 45 and 45A.
While Judge Wilkinson seems to have been confused into doubting whether a suicide attempt
occurred by the statements in the ARTEC records indicating tha* Ms. Bamdt had no suicidal ideation
at the time she was in the program, Judge Wilkinson never found or implied that Ms. Bamdt was not
a credible source of information regarding her own history of suicide (R. 415-417, 657-658, 668).
His rulings seem to reflect his belief that Ms. Bamdt may well have attempted suicide as a juvenile,
but that this evidence did not bear on whether she was likely to have done so as an adult (R. 415-417,
657-658, 668).
The State argues that the ARTEC records were lacking in probative value, because Jaeger
presented no expert testimony that any attempted suicide by Ms. Bamdt when she was a juvenile
bore on the likelihood of her committing suicide as an adult. State's brief at 39.
There is no requirement under rules of evidence 404(a) and 405 that a proponent of relevant
character evidence present expert testimony to establish the inferential probative value of the
evidence. Assuming arguendo that such expert testimony were required, it was presented in this
404(b), not the admission of evidence bearing on a victim's character, which is directly at issue.
State v. Tarafa. 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986), likewise deals with the admission of prior bad
acts evidence against a criminal defendant, and has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence
concerning a victim's contested character trait.
State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980), is an aggravated sexual assault and aggravated
kidnaping case focusing on the admissibility of the sexual history of rape victims, a topic that is
lacking in relevance here.
13

case, when the medical examiner testified that background history of suicide would have borne on
his assessment of whether Ms. Barndt committed suicide in 1990 (e.g. R. 355).
E. JAEGER DID NOT HAVE A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE
UNDER RULE OF EVIDENCE 705 OR OTHERWISE.
The State apparently does not contest that the ARTEC records should have been admissible
to test Dr. Leis's opinion that Ms. Barndt was a homicide victim. See State's brief at 40.
However, the State claims that Jaeger could have somehow used the ARTEC records to
impeach Dr. Leis, despite the fact that the trial court ruled the ARTEC records inadmissible. State's
brief at 40-41.
The State apparently claims that Judge Wilkinson ruled the ARTEC records admissible for
purposes of challenging Dr. Leis's analysis of the homicide/suicide issue. State's brief at 40.
Review of the judge's ruling, supra, demonstrates that Judge Wilkinson preliminarily indicated that
Dr. Leis's testimony opened the door, but that the judge would not admit the ARTEC records until
he reviewed them (R. 416-417).
While the State would have the Court believe that Judge Wilkinson would have permitted
the defense to admit the records to impeach Dr. Leis if the defense had presented Judge Wilkinson
with expert testimony establishing whether or not the ARTEC records were the type of information
a professional would rely on in determining cause of death, this was not Judge Wilkinson's ruling.
As previously discussed, in mentioning expert testimony, Judge Wilkinson merely queried whether
either side would be presenting expert testimony to establish that Ms. Barndt's statements when she
was a juvenile countered the lay witnesses' testimony that Barndt was not a suicidal adult (R. 416417). Assuming that the trial court indeed considered expert testimony a prerequisite to the
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admission of the ARTEC records to impeach Dr. Leis, Dr. Leii did in fact testify that the existence
of a psychiatric history of attempting suicide would have influenced his professional opinion (e.g.
R. 368). Nonetheless, after reading the ARTEC records, Judge Wilkinson entirely excluded the
ARTEC records from evidence (R. 657, 668).
Asidefromthe fact that Judge Wilkinson's ruling excluded the ARTEC records completely,
it would not have been appropriate to introduce the medical records through Dr. Leis, because he was
not the custodian of records from the program, and had no knowledge of Ms. Barndt's suicidal
history, and thus had no personal knowledge of and could not have authenticated the ARTEC
records. See e^g. R. 416 (Judge Wilkinson would not permit defense counsel to interrogate Ms.
Clark about the contents of the ARTEC records because she was "not the proper person," but
requested the records keeper from ARTEC to appear).
The State's suggestion that Mr. Jaeger had a fair opportunity to present his defense because
defense counsel might have asked other family members about Ms. Barndt's suicidal history is
nonsensical. The family members' stance that Ms. Barndt was not suicidal by nature was already
clear on record (e.g. 431, 440, 442, 443, 456-458, 484, 488). Defense counsel would have been
acting against Mr. Jaeger's best interests if he had asked this string of witnesses whether they knew
of Ms. Barndt's history of suicide, and given them the chance to answer in the negative and stand
unimpeachable by the inadmissible ARTEC records, defense counsel's only proof of Ms. Barndt's
suicidal history.

The State's authority cited in support of its argument that Jaeger had a fair

opportunity to present his defense is not supportive.11

The State cites State v. Moton. 749 P.2d 639, 644 (Utah 1988), for this proposition:
"confrontation satisfied where even though defendant was precluded from asking some questions,
15

F. THE EXCLUSION OF THE ARTEC RECORDS WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Because the trial court's ruling excluding the ARTEC records violated Jaeger's federal
constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation, it is the State's burden to prove the
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. S>ee e^g. State v. Villarreah 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah
1995).
The State's argument that what it considers to be simple evidentiary, rather than
constitutional error, was harmless, is premised on the State's statement of the facts, State's brief at
42, which is stated in the light most favorable to the verdict, and wanting in accuracy.
court allowed a 'plentitude* of relevant questions and defendant took the stand". State's brief at 41 42. The portion ofMoton cited is ^plurality opinion. The majority of the Court apparently would
have found that the trial court erred in limiting the defendant's cross-examination. Compare Moton
at 644 (opinion of Justice Howe and then-Chief Justice Hall)(finding no error) with id. at 644
(concurring opinion of then-Justice Zimmerman, joined by Justice Durham)(finding that court's
limitation of questioning was probably error, but harmless); and id. at 644-646 (dissenting opinion
of Justice Stewart)(arguing that limitation of cross-examination was reversible error). Moton is not
controlling here, where the trial court not only limited cross-examination, but actually prevented the
presentation of evidence most key to the defense.
The State cites State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33,35 (Utah 1981), for the proposition that it was
not error for the trial court "to refuse to instruct on defendant's theory of the case where evidence
in support of defense was 'general and vague in nature[.]" State's brief at 42. Harding involved the
trial court's instructing the jury to disregard the defense of self defense when the evidence failed to
establish the defense. Harding does not condone excluding defense evidence, and is thus inapposite.
The State cites State v. Johns. 615 P.2d 1260,1264 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that the
"'right to confrontation requires only that the accused be permitted to introduce all relevant and
admissible evidence.'" State's brief at 42. In Johns, the Court affirmed the exclusion of evidence
concerning the victim's promiscuity, finding that it had no bearing on her consent in the encounter
with the victim. See id. In the instant case, the evidence that Ms. Barndt had reported attempting
suicide was relevant to impeaching the medical examiner's opinion that Ms. Barndt must have been
killed, which opinion was based in part on the fact that she supposedly had no history of attempting
suicide. The evidence was also necessary to challenge the State's evidence from numerous other
witnesses that suicide was inconsistent with Ms. Barndt's fundamental nature. The evidence was
also key to Mr. Jaeger's fundamental defense that Ms. Barndt committed suicide. Because Jaeger
was not permitted to present this relevant and admissible evidence, Johns demonstrates a violation
of his right to confrontation.
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In arguing harmless error, the State claims that the absence of any known history of suicide
was not a major factor in the medical examiner's opinion that Earndt did not commit suicide, and
argues that the lack of suicide history was only discussed "in connection with his conclusion that the
range of firing was atypical of suicide." State's brief at 42 n.32.
The lack of a suicide history and range of firing were separate, unrelated, major factors
underlying the medical examiner's opinion that Barndt did not commit suicide (R. 355, 368).
The State argues that Jaeger is unrealistic to "speculate[s] that the ARTEC records would
have caused the medical examiner to change his opinion." State's brief at 42. n.32.
Regardless of whether Jaeger could persuade Dr. Leis to change his mind with the ARTEC
records, Jaeger's jurors should have had the opportunity to consider whether Leis's opinion was
flawed as a result of the lack of this information, and whether other witnesses attesting to Ms.
Barndt's life-loving nature were fully informed or honest in their testimony.
Because the attempted suicide evidence bore directly on the ultimate question in this case,
the exclusion of the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See e^g. State v. Emmett
839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992)(error going to heart of defense is reversible).
CONCLUSION
This Court should order a new trial in which the ARTEC records are admissible. The Court
should also require the trial court to give the jury the defendant's requested reasonable doubt
instruction.12 The Court should also instruct Judge Wilkinson that in the event of a conviction, he
12

In writing the opening brief, defense counsel was not aware that this Court condoned the
reasonable doubt instruction given here as a correct statement of Utah law, in State v. Robertson, 932
P.2d 1219,1232-33 (Utah 1997). He maintains that Jaeger's requested instruction is superior to that
given, and that Jaeger was entitled to the instruction as a matter of federal constitutional law.
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is to comply with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1.
Respectfully submitted this £>L day of $^L,

$9&

i^ttUA
EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Mr. Jaeger/

/."'"")

L. CLARK DONALDSON
Attorney for Mr. Jaeger
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I, Edward K. Brass, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered/mailed, first-class
postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Christine F. Soltis, Assistant
Attorney General for the State of Utah, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0854, and have caused to be filed the original signature brief and nine additional
copies with the Utah Supreme Court this j ^ d a v of April, 1998

t to#: "^

>W£

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Mr. Jaeger
Filed and mailed/delivered this

day of.

18

., 1998.

